Granicus? No, the Granicus Plains battle, this Dutch historian says

One of my favourite writers is the Dutch historian Jona Lendering, former editor of Ancient History Magazine, a prolific blogger, and a freelance professor specialising in ancient history. I own several of his books, including two on the Punic Wars.

For Dutch readers, I highly recommend Hannibal in de Alpen, in which he meticulously compares the dominant theories regarding Hannibal’s most plausible route through the Alps from various perspectives: historical, topographical, geographical, and linguistic. Lendering has a keen interest in Hannibal, Caesar, and Alexander—the greatest commanders of antiquity.

The Granicus Battle

This month, Lendering blogged about the Battle of the Granicus. We ancient wargamers are well acquainted with this battle, which, according to Wikipedia, took place:

“on the road from Abydus to Dascylium, at the crossing of the Granicus in the Troad region, which is now called the Biga River in Turkey. In the battle, Alexander defeated the field army of the Persian satraps of Asia Minor, which defended the river crossing.”

New Discovery—or Old News?

Last year, Turkish archaeologists claimed they had discovered the exact location:

“After decades of research and exploration, archaeologists have identified the exact location of the Battle of the Granicus, one of Alexander the Great’s most significant victories.”

Lendering, however, dismisses this as old news, writing:

“The archaeologists who announced in late December that they had found the site where Alexander the Great won his first victory over the Persians had nothing to report that we hadn’t already known for a very, very long time. The little river, once the Granicus and now known as the Biga, has long been identified, as has Alexander’s route and the plain where the battle took place.

In short, this was yet another case of historical misinformation: archaeologists fishing for attention at a time when journalists were distracted by Christmas and not particularly critical…”*

How the East Was Won

Different Historical Accounts

What we do not know exactly is how the battle unfolded. Here’s how different ancient historians recorded the battle:

Arrian

  • Provides the most detailed and structured account.
  • Describes a two-phase attack: Amyntas’ charge, then Alexander’s decisive strike.
  • Highlights the superior Macedonian cavalry (xyston lances vs Persian javelins).
  • Alexander’s personal combat with Persian nobles is a focal point.

Plutarch

  • Focuses more on Alexander’s heroism (aristeia).
  • Suggests Persians stationed both infantry and cavalry at the frontline.
  • Greek mercenaries tried to surrender, but Alexander refused.

Diodorus

  • Presents a different version: Alexander crossed the river unopposed at dawn.
  • Simplifies the battle—cavalry engagement, Persian rout, quick infantry clash.
  • Lacks the tactical depth of Arrian’s account.

Why Diodorus is Likely Correct

According to Lendering, Diodorus’ account is the most plausible:

“The slow-moving Granicus River today forms a ten-metre-wide channel through relatively flat terrain, and geologists see no reason to assume that the landscape looked any different in antiquity.

The attack order described by Arrian and Plutarch implies that Alexander’s cavalry first rode into the channel, then crossed the knee-deep water, and finally attempted to climb an extremely steep, often four-metre-high, shrub-covered embankment on horseback. This would have been an impossible feat. The cavalry would have been defenceless against missile fire from the opposite bank.”

Granicus or the Granicus Plain?

A second reason to favour Diodorus’ version is the Persian army’s deployment, Lendering writes:

  • Arrian claims the Persians positioned 20,000 cavalry in front of 20,000 Greek mercenaries.
  • This doesn’t make sense if the battle was fought on the riverbank (horses would be an obstacle).
  • However, if it took place on the plain beyond the river, it makes perfect sense: the Persian cavalry could neutralise Alexander’s cavalry before the Macedonian phalanx arrived.

This suggests that Arrian and Plutarch were influenced by Alexander’s court historian, Callisthenes, who glorified the king and portrayed Parmenion as overly cautious.

Additional Insights from Rob Duif

Dutch historian Rob Duif provides further commentary and analysis:

“I have never seen the site myself, but the claim that the banks of the Granicus were four metres high demonstrates that it was a slow-moving, meandering river that had carved its bed deep over centuries. While the river may have been ten metres wide, even knee-high water would have been a major obstacle for the Macedonian army to cross swiftly—and, of course, the Persians would have known this.”

“Every tactician understands the importance of speed and surprise, especially in the movement of such large forces. Heroic accounts aside, it seems more likely that Macedonian scouts had already identified the lowest banks and the most fordable spots. It is even possible that the Macedonian engineers (‘genie’) had, under the cover of darkness, improved some crossing points to ensure a smoother passage.”

“It stands to reason that the Persians had their own scouts who were well aware of the Macedonian movements. One would expect an initial defensive force of archers to slow down the crossing. However, the Macedonians would likely have had their own ranged units—stone slingers and javelin throwers—to counter this threat.”

“A single crossing point would have been suicidal given the circumstances. It seems more likely that Alexander’s vast army crossed the river at multiple locations, converging on the plain beyond to engage the Persians in battle.”

The Night Before the Battle: A Tactical Advantage

Lendering continues:

“The two armies spent the night facing each other across the Granicus. The Persians had planned to intercept the Macedonians the next day as they attempted to cross the river. However, Alexander did not wait. Since Persian forces were forbidden from marching out before making sacrifices to the rising sun, Alexander and Parmenion took advantage, crossing the river in the final hours of the night.”

Dawn Attack and Persian Disarray

  • Alexander’s attack began at daybreak, catching the Persians off guard.
  • Only part of the Persian cavalry engaged—they were unprepared for battle.
  • Persian elite cavalry tried to kill Alexander, but failed.
  • Persian cavalry interfered with their own Greek mercenaries, weakening their defence.
  • The Macedonian phalanx advanced with little resistance.

Alexander’s Rewards and Recognition

After the battle, Alexander rewarded his troops:

  • Exempted families of fallen soldiers from military service and taxation.
  • Personally visited the wounded, listening to their stories and inspecting their injuries.
  • Encouraged them to boast about their exploits.

Lendering’s analysis sounds like a plausible playbook to me. But then again, he is my favourite Dutch historian!

Final Thoughts

This battle is an excellent scenario for ancient wargaming, and its various interpretations offer multiple ways to replay it. Do you agree with Lendering’s take, or do you favour Arrian or Plutarch? Let’s discuss in the comments!

📜 For further reading, check out Lendering’s blog (in Dutch) and related articles on Alexander’s campaigns!

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